b********n
发帖数: 38600 | 1 A venture capitalist and political scientist, Eric X Li argues that the
universality claim of Western democratic systems is going to be "morally
challenged" by China.
http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_syst | l*******o
发帖数: 5673 | 2 两年前的事了吧 还在炒作
【在 b********n 的大作中提到】
: A venture capitalist and political scientist, Eric X Li argues that the
: universality claim of Western democratic systems is going to be "morally
: challenged" by China.
: http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_syst
| b********n
发帖数: 38600 | 3 A Tale of two Political System
Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born
there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural
Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire
along with my first cries.
0:32
When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed
to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in
linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society,
feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up?
Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language
, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social
development. The entire world's peoples will be unified in this paradise on
Earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we're engaged in
a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of
capitalism, and the good shall triumph.
1:24
That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl
Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and
day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a
bestseller. About one third of the entire world's population lived under
that meta-narrative.
1:45
Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed
religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie.
1:54
(Laughter)
1:58
Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story
wasn't enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also
claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a
singular end. This one went as follows: All societies, regardless of culture
, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional
societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which
atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are,
by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because
they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and
live happily ever after. Paradise on Earth, again. Sooner or later,
electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and
all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get
there, we're engaged in a struggle between good and evil. (Laughter) The
good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of
spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those
who do not hold elections.
3:18
(Video) George H.W. Bush: A new world order ...
3:20
(Video) George W. Bush: ... ending tyranny in our world ...
3:22
(Video) Barack Obama: ... a single standard for all who would hold power.
3:27
Eric X. Li: Now --
3:29
(Laughter) (Applause)
3:37
This story also became a bestseller. According to Freedom House, the number
of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years,
Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus:
Multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is
the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who
buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to
fail. But this time, the Chinese didn't buy it.
4:13
Fool me once ...
4:16
(Laughter)
4:20
The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest
agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six
hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of
the entire world's poverty alleviation during that period happened in China.
In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a
mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting.
4:48
See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few
hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate all
my grandmother's portions.
5:00
So I asked myself, what's wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown,
my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies
every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in
human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be
happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes,
China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party,
and they don't hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant
political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid,
politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are
wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are
the three defining characteristics of China's one-party system.
5:57
Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is
inherently incapable of self-correction. It won't last long because it
cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest
country in the world, the range of the Party's policies has been wider than
any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to
the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural
Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping's market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin
took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private
businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao's rule.
6:38
So the Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new
rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term
limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they
used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father
of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the
Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70.
7:06
One thing we often hear is, "Political reforms have lagged far behind
economic reforms," and "China is in dire need of political reform." But this
claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have
decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such
changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have
never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago,
every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most
local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such
changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most
fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world's
leading expert in political reform.
7:56
The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated
in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed,
corruption is a big problem, but let's first look at the larger context. Now
, this may be counterintuitive to you. The Party happens to be one of the
most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China's highest
ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only
five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings. The
other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely
ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the
percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller.
The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to
the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and
developing countries, I think you'll find the Party being near the top in
upward mobility.
8:53
The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one
party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to
Westerners: the Party's Organization Department. The department functions
like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of
the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of
three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social
organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate
yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college
grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from
the bottom, called "keyuan" [clerk]. Then they could get promoted through
four increasingly elite ranks: fuke [deputy section manager], ke [section
manager], fuchu [deputy division manager], and chu [division manger]. Now
these are not moves from "Karate Kid," okay? It's serious business. The
range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign
investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the
department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their
peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct
public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their
careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over
time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju [deputy
bureau chief] and ju [bureau chief] levels. There, they enter high
officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a
district with a population in the millions or a company with hundreds of
millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system
is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu
levels, and only 40,000 fuju and ju levels.
10:47
After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and
eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three
decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But merit remains the
fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a
modernized version of China's centuries-old mentoring system. China's new
president, Xi Jinping, is the son of a former leader, which is very unusual,
first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30
years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the
Politburo, he had managed areas with a total population of 150 million
people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars.
11:33
Now, please don't get me wrong, okay? This is not a put-down of anyone. It's
just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a put-
down. (Laughter) Before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before
running for president, could not make even a small county manager in China's
system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system
except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn't heard of the
Organization Department.
12:05
Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal
suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy.
12:13
I was asked once, "The Party wasn't voted in by election. Where is the
source of legitimacy?"
12:19
I said, "How about competency?"
12:23
We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired
in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at
that time, 41 years old. Today, it's the second largest economy in the
world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing
prosperity.
12:41
Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in
recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent.
Those who think they're better off than five years ago: 70 percent. Those
who expect the future to be better: a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times
polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from
last week. Ninety-three percent of China's Generation Y are optimistic about
their country's future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I'm not sure what
is.
13:19
In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from
dismal performance. I don't need to elaborate for this audience how
dysfunctional it is, from Washington to European capitals. With a few
exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted
electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife.
Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a
few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy
is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I'm afraid
it is democracy, not China's one-party system, that is in danger of losing
legitimacy.
14:02
Now, I don't want to create the misimpression that China's hunky-dory, on
the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges
. The social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this
are mind-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the
political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread
and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts
misdiagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-
party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with
the entire system.
14:39
But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International
ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it's
been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping.
For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half
of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for
corruption, how come these countries can't fix it?
15:07
Now, I'm a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn't be fair to end this
talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here
they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the
largest economy in the world. Income per capita will be near the top of all
developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and
China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic
reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party
system will hold firm.
15:41
We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims
failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative
is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to
clarify something. I'm not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the
contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the
creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western
elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the
heart of the West's current ills. If they would spend just a little less
time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on
political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance.
China's political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because
unlike the latter, it doesn't pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported
. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China's example is
not that it provides an alternative, but the demonstration that alternatives
exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and
democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic
universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there's
only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all
societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all,
it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more
interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it?
17:24
Thank you.
17:26
(Applause)
17:42
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks.
17:45
Bruno Giussani: Eric, stay with me for a couple of minutes, because I want
to ask you a couple of questions. I think many here, and in general in
Western countries, would agree with your statement about analysis of
democratic systems becoming dysfunctional, but at the same time, many would
kind of find unsettling the thought that there is an unelected authority
that, without any form of oversight or consultation, decides what the
national interest is. What is the mechanism in the Chinese model that allows
people to say, actually, the national interest as you defined it is wrong?
18:23
EXL: You know, Frank Fukuyama, the political scientist, called the Chinese
system "responsive authoritarianism." It's not exactly right, but I think it
comes close. So I know the largest public opinion survey company in China,
okay? Do you know who their biggest client is? The Chinese government. Not
just from the central government, the city government, the provincial
government, to the most local neighborhood districts. They conduct surveys
all the time. Are you happy with the garbage collection? Are you happy with
the general direction of the country? So there is, in China, there is a
different kind of mechanism to be responsive to the demands and the thinking
of the people. My point is, I think we should get unstuck from the thinking
that there's only one political system -- election, election, election --
that could make it responsive. I'm not sure, actually, elections produce
responsive government anymore in the world.
19:18
(Applause)
19:22
BG: Many seem to agree. One of the features of a democratic system is a
space for civil society to express itself. And you have shown figures about
the support that the government and the authorities have in China. But then
you've just mentioned other elements like, you know, big challenges, and
there are, of course, a lot of other data that go in a different direction:
tens of thousands of unrests and protests and environmental protests, etc.
So you seem to suggest the Chinese model doesn't have a space outside of the
Party for civil society to express itself.
19:56
EXL: There's a vibrant civil society in China, whether it's environment or
what-have-you. But it's different. You wouldn't recognize it. Because, by
Western definitions, a so-called civil society has to be separate or even in
opposition to the political system, but that concept is alien for Chinese
culture. For thousands of years, you have civil society, yet they are
consistent and coherent and part of a political order, and I think it's a
big cultural difference.
20:28
BG: Eric, thank you for sharing this with TED. EXL: Thank you. | E******w
发帖数: 2616 | 4 这人读了那么多年的书，就学会了替统治阶级说话。虽然我不觉得西方制度有多大优势
，但是我鄙视这种赤裸裸地舔权贵阶级的行为。他这个Ted talk还算包装得不错，但是
你去看看他其他的talk，基本没法听。奴才的嘴脸暴露无疑。
【在 b********n 的大作中提到】
: A venture capitalist and political scientist, Eric X Li argues that the
: universality claim of Western democratic systems is going to be "morally
: challenged" by China.
: http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_syst
| l*******o
发帖数: 5673 | 5 你这个喷的没有水平
【在 E******w 的大作中提到】
: 这人读了那么多年的书，就学会了替统治阶级说话。虽然我不觉得西方制度有多大优势
: ，但是我鄙视这种赤裸裸地舔权贵阶级的行为。他这个Ted talk还算包装得不错，但是
: 你去看看他其他的talk，基本没法听。奴才的嘴脸暴露无疑。
| BR
发帖数: 4151 | 6 eric li 的话抽象地看还是有些道理的，但是庆丰所作所为实际上打了eric li 的脸。 | m**i
发帖数: 9848 | 7 don't be silly. ted is just a brainwashing institute. | a*****5
发帖数: 478 | 8 这些中国人是不是没见过世面。
当年苏联的成就把美国的脸打得比这历害一万倍
这种小儿科还好意思出来丢人
【在 b********n 的大作中提到】
: A venture capitalist and political scientist, Eric X Li argues that the
: universality claim of Western democratic systems is going to be "morally
: challenged" by China.
: http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_x_li_a_tale_of_two_political_syst
| S**M
发帖数: 959 | 9 哈，beijingren总算青蒿素治好了痢疾，排泄物送算有干货没那么水了，可惜几年前的
老屎，现在才掘出来，真是与时俱进啊。
这个傻逼Eric的傻逼演讲还被人当成宝了，中国社会的层层选拔权力金字塔跟科举制度
有区别么？不过就是秀才举人进士状元变成科长处长局长部长换了个名字而已，权力自
上而下分配大家一起分赃的基本格局一点没变，这种权力结构最大的问题就是腐败，而
且还是一串子的系统性群体腐败，只要上面的负责分配的权力的人还罩着，想怎么操都
可以，腐败的利益拿出一部分当作保护费层层往上输送，交换上面一级的保护。
没错，Eric说得对，中国是他妈的效率最高，可是丫没说腐败的效率更是名列前茅，这
哥们只提效率，腐败轻轻带过，其心可诛。几千年的糟粕还好意思拿出来秀，与其说
打美国的脸，不如是打中国自己的脸。
这几年习大胖子反腐每反出一个都是底下一大串，算不算打Eric精英选拔金字塔制度的
脸啊？
born
【在 b********n 的大作中提到】
: A Tale of two Political System
: Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn't born
: there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural
: Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire
: along with my first cries.
: 0:32
: When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed
: to know about humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in
: linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society,
: feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up?
| t*c
发帖数: 8291 | 10 美国的腐败，你连皮毛都摸不着。
为什么纽约的桥花了一千万美元和十年时间都修不好？ 为什么trump用自己的钱只花了
100万和几个月时间就修好了？
为什么美国基层学区会欠债累累，濒临破产？
为什么美国市政建设花费巨资却不见效果？
美国的腐败也是深入到每一个毛孔。
【在 S**M 的大作中提到】
: 哈，beijingren总算青蒿素治好了痢疾，排泄物送算有干货没那么水了，可惜几年前的
: 老屎，现在才掘出来，真是与时俱进啊。
: 这个傻逼Eric的傻逼演讲还被人当成宝了，中国社会的层层选拔权力金字塔跟科举制度
: 有区别么？不过就是秀才举人进士状元变成科长处长局长部长换了个名字而已，权力自
: 上而下分配大家一起分赃的基本格局一点没变，这种权力结构最大的问题就是腐败，而
: 且还是一串子的系统性群体腐败，只要上面的负责分配的权力的人还罩着，想怎么操都
: 可以，腐败的利益拿出一部分当作保护费层层往上输送，交换上面一级的保护。
: 没错，Eric说得对，中国是他妈的效率最高，可是丫没说腐败的效率更是名列前茅，这
: 哥们只提效率，腐败轻轻带过，其心可诛。几千年的糟粕还好意思拿出来秀，与其说
: 打美国的脸，不如是打中国自己的脸。
| | | a*****5
发帖数: 478 | 11 这是效率问题，和腐败无关
你连什么是腐败都搞不明白
【在 t*c 的大作中提到】
: 美国的腐败，你连皮毛都摸不着。
: 为什么纽约的桥花了一千万美元和十年时间都修不好？ 为什么trump用自己的钱只花了
: 100万和几个月时间就修好了？
: 为什么美国基层学区会欠债累累，濒临破产？
: 为什么美国市政建设花费巨资却不见效果？
: 美国的腐败也是深入到每一个毛孔。
| S**M
发帖数: 959 | 12 哈，秀智商了吧？美国式的腐败本质是浪费和低效，上千万上亿的建设花费大部分是被
低效的美国政府雇员和建筑承包商一天拿8小时的钱干2小时的活浪费掉了。人家川普可不
是傻子被政治正确束手束脚用这些低效人群做事情，自己找对的人自然又快又好。
当然你要非说这也是腐败也可以，不过至少美国的腐败还能养一养底层的懒汉和屁民维
护一下社会稳定。中国的腐败直接变成你共在温哥华的house和各位公子们的法拉利了
，你吃到了个屁？
【在 t*c 的大作中提到】
: 美国的腐败，你连皮毛都摸不着。
: 为什么纽约的桥花了一千万美元和十年时间都修不好？ 为什么trump用自己的钱只花了
: 100万和几个月时间就修好了？
: 为什么美国基层学区会欠债累累，濒临破产？
: 为什么美国市政建设花费巨资却不见效果？
: 美国的腐败也是深入到每一个毛孔。
| d*******p
发帖数: 2525 | 13 一千万10年修不好桥和腐败没关系，那是工会的问题，只要是工会成员进行的公众工程
，就没好的 | S**M
发帖数: 959 | 14 你算是个明白人，一针见脓
【在 d*******p 的大作中提到】
: 一千万10年修不好桥和腐败没关系，那是工会的问题，只要是工会成员进行的公众工程
: ，就没好的
| a*****5
发帖数: 478 | 15 其实要是可以象土共那样剥削中国人，就算有工会，我帝的效率也会比中国高多了
美国当年俢铁路，有中国人剥削，那效率没人能比
【在 d*******p 的大作中提到】
: 一千万10年修不好桥和腐败没关系，那是工会的问题，只要是工会成员进行的公众工程
: ，就没好的
| l*******o
发帖数: 5673 | 16 中国旁边印度菲律宾泰国蒙古这些非中式制度的国家腐败怎么样？
另外貌似意大利腐败水平跟中国差不 corruption perception index在一个区间的
可不
【在 S**M 的大作中提到】
: 哈，秀智商了吧？美国式的腐败本质是浪费和低效，上千万上亿的建设花费大部分是被
: 低效的美国政府雇员和建筑承包商一天拿8小时的钱干2小时的活浪费掉了。人家川普可不
: 是傻子被政治正确束手束脚用这些低效人群做事情，自己找对的人自然又快又好。
: 当然你要非说这也是腐败也可以，不过至少美国的腐败还能养一养底层的懒汉和屁民维
: 护一下社会稳定。中国的腐败直接变成你共在温哥华的house和各位公子们的法拉利了
: ，你吃到了个屁？
| a*****y
发帖数: 33185 | |
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